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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
the trial court will generally raise the issue sua sponte if the parties
do not.256
Indemnity Contracts
One area in which Dole has been held inapplicable is where an
indemnity agreement exists between the parties. In Williams v. D. A. H.
Construction Corp.,259 the Appellate Division, Second Department,
reversed the trial court's direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and third-party plaintiff, and remanded for a determination of whether
the terms of the indemnity contract had been satisfied, i.e., whether
the plaintiff's injury was caused by any act or omission by the third-
party defendant. The court stated that Dole does not apply in this
situation.260 It is notable, however, that while the indemnity agreement
controls the third-party plaintiff's claim here, Dole would have pro-
duced the same effect as the terms of the contract.
Court of Claims
The New York State Constitution establishes the Court of Claims
as the exclusive forum for claims against the state.261 As to claims
against all other defendants, however, the court has no competence
whatsoever. Because this truncated jurisdiction rules out third-party
practice,262 several actions may be necessary to finally resolve a contro-
versy to which the state is a party. This shortcoming of Court of Claims
practice has become all the more apparent since Dole.2 63 When the
268 The Second Department requires the trial court to sua sponte charge the jury
with respect to apportionment of fault even absent a crossclaim. Stein v. Whitehead, 40
App. Div. 2d 89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821 (2d Dep't 1972). See also i1pson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d
599, 602, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972) ("The court on its own
initiative is to instruct the jury to fix responsibility among the defendants and apportion
damages among those found to be liable.").
269 42 App. Div. 2d 877, 346 N.Y.S.2d 862 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
26o But see Schwab, supra note 232, at 160-61, where the author states:
If the intent of Dole, inter alia, is to broaden the basis of recovery and to induce
otherwise reluctant litigants to contribute towards a settlement, surely the con-
tractual indemnification case law of New York, as recent as it is, accomplishes a
contrary result.
261 The court has jurisdiction over "claims against the state or by the state against
the claimant or between conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide." N.Y. CONsr.
art. 4, § 9. See generally McNamara, The Court of Claims: Its Development and Present
Role in the Unified Court System, 40 ST. JOHN's L. RFv. 1 (1965); Jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims, Consolidation into the Supreme Court, in SEcoND AqNtuAL REPORT OF THE N.Y.
JUDICAL CONFERNCE 94 (1957).
262 See Horoch v. State, 286 App. Div. 308, 143 N.Y.S.2d 327 (3d Dep't 1955). Trial by
jury is not available in the Court of Claims. N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 12(3) (McKinney 1963). Im-
pleader by the state would, therefore, deprive a third-party defendant of a constitutionally
guaranteed right. N.Y. CoNsT. art 1, § 2.
263 See Bartlett v. State, 40 App. Div. 2d 267, 840 N.Y.S.2d 66 (4th Dep't 1973) (state
may not seek a Dole apportionment in the Court of Claims).
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